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Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast: More Confusion
in an Already Confused Area
After years of uncertainty in Louisiana with respect to the application
of comparative fault to strict products liability, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the following question to the
Louisiana Supreme Court: "Does the Louisiana Civil Code permit the
defense known as contributory negligence to be advanced to defeat or
mitigate a claim of strict liability based upon a defective product, the
theory of liability commonly known as 'products liability?' ' ' This note
attempts to analyze the rather confusing answer given by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast.'
In Jet Wheel, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for injuries
occasioned while working on a large shot blast machine which defendant
had manufactured and installed. Plaintiff's injury occurred when his
hand got caught in the chain and sprocket drive of the machine's
conveyor system. The jury found that the shot blast machine was de-
fective, and that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury.
Nevertheless, the jury also found that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent.3 Defendant contended that the finding of contributory neg-
ligence exonerated it from liability because the finding constituted "victim
fault" under Louisiana law.4 In answering the certified question sub-
mitted by the Fifth Circuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:
Contributory negligence does not apply in strict products liability
actions. The principle of comparative fault may be applied in
some products cases according to precepts formulated by analogy
to the principle of Civil Code article 2323. The principle does
not apply, however, and the plaintiff's recovery cannot be di-
minished in a case such as the present one involving an industrial
accident resulting in injury to an employee's hand due to de-
fective machinery and the employee's ordinary contributory neg-
ligence. Under these circumstances the application of comparative
fault would tend to defeat the basic goals of strict products
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d. 166, 168 (La. 1985).
2. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
3. Id. at 167-68.
4. Id. at 168.
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liability without providing any additional incentive for careful
product use.'
The court based its decision not to reduce plaintiff's award on the
fact that plaintiff was injured while performing a repetitive operation
with a defective industrial machine as required by his employer. Plain-
tiff's hand got caught in the machine both because the front of the
machine lacked an adequate guard and because of his own negligence
in operating the machine. The court reasoned that, "[u]nder these cir-
cumstances, the application of comparative fault would not serve to
provide any greater incentive to an employee to guard against momentary
neglect or inattention so as to prevent his hand from being mangled by
machinery." ' 6 Justice Dennis, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
recovery of a plaintiff who has been injured by a defective product
should not be reduced in those cases where it does not realistically serve
to promote careful product use or where it drastically reduces the man-
ufacturer's incentive to make a safe product.
The court's comparative negligence analysis provides little guidance
for the lower courts in deciding when contributory negligence will reduce
a plaintiff's award in a strict products liability case. By stating that a
plaintiff's contributory negligence will reduce his recovery only where
it will encourage careful product use and where it will not reduce
incentives for manufacturers to create safe products, the supreme court
requires lower courts to decide on an ad hoc basis whether or not to
reduce a plaintiff's recovery. The absence of a sound analytical basis
to the result reached in Jet Wheel (as will be shown below) prevents
litigants from being able to forecast with any certainty whether con-
tributory negligence will reduce a plaintiff's recovery in a strict products
liability action.
Justice Blanche in his dissent stated that "the bench and bar would
be better served if the doctrine of comparative negligence would be
applied uniformly." 8 Justice Blanche explained that "[ilt would be a
simple matter to apply comparative negligence in all cases where the
fault of both parties contributes to the injury." 9 Instead, Blanche argued,
5. Id. at 173. La. Civ. Code art. 2323 states:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effects
shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly
of his own negligence and partly as the result of the fault of another person
or persons, the claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount
of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage
of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death, or loss.
6. Id. at 172.
7. Id. at 171-72.
8. Id. at 174.
9. Id. at 174.
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the majority has complicated the legislative effort to do justice between
litigants by deciding that in a products liability case comparative neg-
ligence will be applied only where these pro-safety policy inquiries are
answered affirmatively. 0 Justice Blanche's solution in Jet Wheel was to
assess the manufacturer with anywhere from ninety-five to ninety-nine
percent of the fault and the injured worker with the remainder." He
reasoned that since the plaintiff was injured while working with his
hands on a defective machine for another's profit, this small reduction
would require the plaintiff to be responsible for his fault while the
manufacturer would be sufficiently penalized to encourage it to produce
safer products.'" The writer agrees with Justice Blanche especially in
light of the unfairness that would follow where the defendant was held
liable without having been negligent (which is possible under strict li-
ability) while, at the same time, a negligent plaintiff was allowed to
recover one hundred percent of his damages and escape responsibility
for his own fault. A basic premise of strict liability is that as between
two innocent parties, the manufacturer and the consumer, the manu-
facturer should bear the loss. Therefore, it appears ironic to allow a
negligent defendant to escape total liability by reducing the plaintiff's
award because of contributory negligence, and then subject a non-
negligent manufacturer to total liability in favor of a contributorily
negligent plaintiff merely because he is liable under the theory of strict
liability."
Some of the cases interpreting Jet Wheel demonstrate some of the
problems resulting from that decision. In Holmes v. State, 4 plaintiff-
driver sued the Department of Highways (DOTD) for damages caused
by a defective road shoulder. When plaintiff allowed the left wheels of
his car to stray onto the shoulder, the wheels hit a five inch rut in the
highway and caused an accident. The third circuit found the DOTD
strictly liable under article 2317 of the Civil Code 5 for the defective
shoulder, and it also found the plaintiff to be contributorily negligent.' 6
Although the court recognized that this was not technically a products
liability case, it looked to the policy considerations espoused in Jet
Wheel to determine whether to reduce the plaintiff's award: "Would
10. Id.
II. 462 So. 2d at 174.
12. Id.
13. See Sullivan v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 382 So. 2d; 184, 189 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980).
14. 466 So. 2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2317 states: "We are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom
we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody."
16. 466 So. 2d at 823.
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reducing [the plaintiff's] award act as an incentive for motorists to
operate their vehicles more safely on the highways? We think that it
would. Will the reduction of [the plaintiff's] award lessen the incentive
of DOTD to maintain reasonably safe highways and shoulders? We
think not.' 1  Therefore, the court held that this was an appropriate
case for the application of comparative negligence.
The Holmes court provided no underlying legal analysis for its result.
The court's decision to decrease plaintiff's award can be explained only
as" a visceral response by the judges to the policy questions with which
they were confronted. It is difficult to understand why a negligent worker
injured by a defective machine may recover all of his damages, and a
negligent driver injured by an equally defective highway may only recover
part of his damages. The driver, but not the worker, is held accountable
for his own inadvertence. Arguably, reducing one worker's recovery
based on his negligence encourages all workers to be more careful,
without reducing the incentive for the manufacturer to produce safe
products because the manufacturer knows it will be exposed to at least
some liability. The possibility that a court might apportion ninety-five
percent of the fault to the manufacturer should be incentive enough to
encourage it to make safe products. The worker/driver distinction is
not significant enough to warrant different results.
In Turner v. New Orleans Public Service Inc.,'8 Justice Blanche
reiterated the defect with Jet Wheel's reasoning:
To say that the doctrine of comparative fault will only be applied
in certain cases simply ignores the obvious intent of the legis-
lature in adopting the comparative fault statute. Language such
as that found in Jet Wheel Blast ... is nothing more than
saying that cases will be decided on a socioeconomic basis rather
than following the clear requirement of the law. It tells the trial
courts to first balance the rights and duties of parties, determine
what result is wanted and then decide if the law should be
applied. This simply is not what was intended. La. C.C. art.
2323 requires that the plaintiff's recovery be reduced to the
extent of his fault in all cases arising under comparative fault.19
Justice Blanche describes is exactly what happened in Holmes. Since
holding, the state strictly liable is not favored in Louisiana,20 it is entirely
plausible that part of the court's rationale for decreasing the plaintiff's
award was based on economic considerations rather than on the clear
17. 466 So. 2d at 824.
18. 471 So. 2d 709 (La. 1985).
19. Id. at 715 (Blanche, J., concurring).
20. 1985 La. Acts No. 454 eliminates a plaintiff's strict liability action against the
state or any of its entities.
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requirement of Civil Code Article 2323. Nevertheless, uniformity of
decision is a crucial objective of any legal system. The Holmes and Jet
Wheel reasoning reduces any possibility of uniform results with respect
to the application of comparative negligence to strict liability in Loui-
siana.
In Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. ,21 the supreme court
held that comparative negligence applies to reduce a pedestrian plaintiff's
award against a motorist. Justice Dennis distinguished Jet Wheel, stating
that pedestrians are in a better position to avoid collisions with negligent
drivers than laborers are to escape injury by defective machinery with
which they are forced to work due to economic circumstances. He
reasoned that if a pedestrian knows his fault will reduce recovery then
he at least has greater power and opportunity to prevent the accident.12
Although Turner is a negligence case, the Jet Wheel policy consid-
erations were used in Justice Dennis' reasoning. Turner addressed the
question of whether reducing a plaintiff's award will increase consumer-
i.e., pedestrian-safety. Why is a pedestrian walking on a highway in
a better position to avoid an accident with an automobile than a worker
who usually has the skill and training needed to operate the defective
product? If reducing a pedestrian's award because of his negligence
serves to increase pedestrian safety, logic dictates that reducing a worker's
award because of his negligence tends to force the worker to use the
product more safely. Part of Justice Dennis' reasoning in Turner is that
justice requires that the pedestrian be held accountable for his own
negligence. 2 Should not the same justice be applied to a worker like
the one in Jet Wheel?
The first circuit apparently disapproved of Jet Wheel when it applied
comparative negligence to a recent strict liability case arising under Civil
Code article 2317. The court quoted the language in Justice Blanche's
dissent: " 'It would be a simple matter to apply comparative negligence
in all cases where the fault of both parties contributes [to] the injury,
whether under Civil Code Article 2315 or Article 2317 or any other
conceivable theory of liability." '24
21. 471 So. 2d. 709 (La. 1985).
22. 475 So. 2d. 765 (La. 1985). These additional reasons were omitted from the
bound volume of the Southern Reporter, but they were in the paperback reporters.
Nevertheless, the additional reasons were assigned by Justice Dennis, the author of the
Jet Wheel majority opinion, and his comments are relevant.
23. 475 So. 2d. at 767.
24. Turner v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 472 So. 2d. 43, 48 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1985) (emphasis added by Turner court). See also Davis v. Marshall, 467 So. 2d 1211,
1216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985), where Judge Sexton cited Jet Wheel and pleaded for new
legislation with respect to the application of comparative negligence to products liability
because of the complex state of the law at the present time.
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Jet Wheel's ambiguity is further exemplified in Hayes v. State,2
where the DOTD was held strictly liable to a motorist for a defective
road shoulder. Using the Jet Wheel rationale, the third circuit held that
the motorist's contributory negligence would reduce his claim because
"society's reliance on automotive transportation and the need for the
safe operation of the motoring public on roadways free from hazards
which create an unreasonable risk of harm is best served up by the
application of comparative negligence." ' 26 The court did not mention Jet
Wheel's other prong: that the plaintiff's recovery will not be reduced
if such a reduction would reduce the manufacturer's incentive to create
safe products or things. If the Jet Wheel reasoning were used in its
entirety, it could be argued that reducing the motorist's award would
certainly reduce the DOTD's incentive to make safe road shoulders.
Hayes illustrates the flaw in the Jet Wheel rationale and the necessity
for a uniform application of comparative negligence. Jet Wheel allows
the trial court to pick and choose which policy questions it wishes to
address and to answer those questions based on whether or not that
particular court believes the plaintiff's recovery should be decreased.
The court in Hayes narrowed the Jet Wheel two-pronged test to a single
inquiry which it answered in one sentence. It is possible that courts
who address this issue in the future may eliminate discussing all of Jet
Wheel's policy questions. Thus, courts may, without any legal analysis,
decide cases on an ad hoc basis, saying certain cases are, and certain
cases are not, appropriate for applying comparative negligence. Clearly,
uniformity of decision will suffer.
One reason for the court's refusal to reduce the plaintiff's recovery
in Jet Wheel was that economic conditions forced his encounter with
the machine; he was therefore held to a lower standard of care with
respect to protecting himself. 27 It seems, however, that economic con-
ditions force many motorists to be on the road: they must shop for
food, take their children to school, and get to and from work. Never-
theless, the negligent motorist on a pleasure trip confronts the risks of
"defective" highways in a manner indistinguishable from the negligent
motorist whose presence on the road is due to economic necessity. A
formula which allows the latter to recover and not the former seems
unjust.
In Barnett v. Gehl Co.,26 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana held that comparative negligence could
25. 467 So. 2d 604 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 609.
27. 462 So. 2d at 172. See also Lanclos v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 So. 2d. 924,
933 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
28. 605 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. La. 1985).
1112 [Vol. 46
NOTES
be asserted as a defense to a products liability action, where the consumer
was not operating a machine in an industrial setting as required by his
employer, but rather, was independently operating a machine in a farm
setting. 29 The court, admitting that Jet Wheel is rife with uncertainty, 0
distinguished Jet Wheel because there the plaintiff was injured while
performing a repetitive operation with a defective industrial machine as
required by his employer.31 The court reasoned that the threat of re-
duction in recovery would provide the user of the product with an
incentive to use it carefully but would not reduce the manufacturer's
incentive to make a safer product. 2 The Barnett court, following the
Jet Wheel rationale, did not explain why a worker doing repetitive tasks
was not held accountable for his own negligence, but a farm worker
who was probably forced to work on the farm machine because of
similar economic conditions was held accountable for his negligence.
The threat of diminished recovery increases a worker's incentive to
use products safely whether in an industrial setting or a farm setting.
In addition, the possibility that the manufacturer may have to pay ninety-
nine percent of the recovery to anyone will certainly provide incentive
for it to produce safe products. There is no clear reason to distinguish
between the two situations. If Jet Wheel is applied by other state courts,
Louisiana will have one distinct class of persons (industrial workers
doing repetitive tasks) to whom comparative negligence will not apply.
Such a classification does not seem fair, and could present certain
constitutional problems."
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
that those people who are similarly situated will be treated similarly.34
Civil Code Article 2323 may not on its face draw any classification,
but it may nonetheless be applied in a way that classes are in fact being
drawn in the judicial process." By not applying the principles of com-
parative negligence to industrial workers doing repetitive tasks, the state
is arguably creating an unreasonable classification of persons.
It seems unfair to allow a worker who is skilled and experienced
in the use of a product to escape liability for his own negligence, but
29. Id. at 185.
30. Id. at 184.
31. Id. at 185.
32. Id.
33. This article is not an exposition of all of Jet Wheel's constitutional ramifications.
The basic questions of whether these two types of plaintiffs are similarly situated, or
whether the court should use the rational basis test or strict scrutiny test is not addressed.
In this context, the argument is merely presented for reflection and to point out some
of the possible problems with Jet Wheel.
34. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 993 (1978).
35. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young, Constitutional Law 524 (1978).
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to hold an unskilled consumer accountable for his contributory negli-
gence. Since the ability to spread loss is an important policy consideration
in imposing strict liability on manufacturers of products, it should be
remembered that a skilled worker is usually in a much better position
to spread the loss than is an average consumer. Not only does the
worker have access to workers' compensation laws, but in all probability
his employer has some other sort of health insurance to cover him for
on-the job accidents. Since the worker has this protection, it would be
absurd not to hold him accountable for his own negligence. Certainly
the average consumer does not have this much protection against ac-
cidents.
One other problem created by not applying comparative negligence
across the board arises in the context of multiparty litigation. For
example, suppose an industrial worker performing a repetitive task is
injured in part through the combined negligence of himself and a third
person, and also because of a defective machine. This worker would
sue the third person in negligence and the manufacturer of the machine
in strict products liability. According to Jet Wheel the worker could
recover his total damages from the manufacturer, but his recovery would
be reduced against the negligent third person because of the worker's
contributory negligence. Not only is it unfair to reduce the worker's
award against a negligent defendant and not against a strictly liable
defendant, but if a few more parties were added to the litigation, the
trial might well become too complicated for a jury to understand.
Professor Roberts of the University of Texas Law School states that,
"[ulnless comparative fault works across the board, multiparty litigation
can become well-nigh impossible to administer. '3 6
At least five strong arguments exists for applying comparative neg-
ligence uniformly to all strict liability defendants:"
(1) Any other resolution disagreeably complicates multiple
defendant cases.
(2) It is anomalous to treat negligent defendants more favorably
than strict liability defendants.
(3) It is more fair as between the plaintiff and the strict liability
defendant to take the plaintiff's fault into account.
36. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty/Risk Analysis, Affirmative
Defenses, and Defense Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana.
44 La. L. Rev. 1341, 1354 (1984).
37. The opposite argument that comparative negligence offends the basic premises of
strict products liability was stated by Judge Politz in the panel opinion in Lewis v. Timco,
Inc., 697 F.2d. 1252 (5th Cir. 1983) and in his dissent from the en banc reversal, 716
F.2d at 1433 (5th Cir. 1983).
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(4) To the extent that tort law deters substandard conduct, a
deterrent effect is built into the reduction of the plaintiff's
recovery on the basis of his own fault.
(5) To the extent that refusal to take plaintiff fault into account
yields large recoveries against strictly liable defendants in favor
of negligent plaintiffs, the strict liability theories themselves are
brought into disrepute and a considerable incentive is created
for the courts or legislature to abolish or curtail the operation
of those doctrines. 38
Not only are these reasons persuasive, but a number of courts in other
jurisdictions have held that the rule of comparative negligence is, without
exception, applicable to products liability actions based upon strict li-
ability in tort.39 In Daly v. General Motors Corp.,4° the California
Supreme Court held that "apportioning tort liability is sound, logical,
and capable of wider application than to negligence cases alone, and
that to hold otherwise would be to perpetuate a system which placed
upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by
hypothesis, responsible."'4 The court stressed that fairness required ex-
tending a full system of comparative fault to strict products liability. 42
The problems created by the Jet Wheel decision should be recognized,
and comparative fault principles should be uniformly applied to all strict
products liability actions. Civil Code article 2323 states that "[ilf a
person suffers injury . . . as a result partly of his own negligence and
partly as a result of the fault of another person ... the amount of
damages recoverable shall be reduced." '4 3 "Fault" should be read to
include all strict liability situations, not just a select few. The legislature
did not expressly choose to except industrial workers performing repet-
itive tasks from the application of Article 2323. The court should not
detract from the plain language of the statute by creating such an
exception. Uniform application of comparative negligence will ameliorate
the harshness of the complete bar of contributory negligence and will
balance the manufacturer's responsibility to the public against the user's
38. See supra note 36.
39. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d. 725 (1978); Dippel v. Sciana, 37 Wis. 2d 443 (1967).
For cases involving industrial workers, see Ludwig v. Ermanco, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1229
(E.D. Wis. 1981); Lenhern v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Supp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980). But see
Suter v. San Angelo Foundary Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150 (1979) which seems to follow the
Jet Wheel rationale.
40. 20 Cal. 3d 725 (1978).
41. Id. at 727.
42. Id. at 727.
43. See supra note 5.
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conduct in contributing to his own injuries. As of now, however, we
must adhere to Justice Dennis' reasoning in Jet Wheel:
Pending future judicial or legislative developments, we are con-
tent for the present to assume the position .. . [of] abstain[ing]
from issuing a detailed guidebook to the new area of comparative
negligence, preferring to adopt the view "that the trial judges
of this State are capable of applying [a] comparative negligence
rule without our setting guidelines in anticipation of expected
problems.""
A "detailed guidebook" to the application of comparative fault
principles is not necessary in light of the unambiguous wording of Civil
Code article 2323; but until Jet Wheel is modified or overruled, an ad
hoc approach goes on.
Jeff Tillery
44. 462 So. 2d at 172. Although the language used by Justice Dennis may be
interpreted to mean that the application of comparative negligence to products liability
is a jurisprudentially created rule which applied the principles of article 2323 by analogy,
the writer believes that the lower courts will simply use the wording of article 2323 to
apply comparative negligence to products liability in cases in which the issue of retroactivity
of the statute is not an issue. Even if the court is creating a jurisprudential rule and not
a statutory rule, application of the principle of article 2323 should at the very least include
an analysis of the statute's wording.
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